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SUMMARY
Human productivity and well-being in space are dependent on the effective-
ness with which space projects are planned and managed. To learn how ground-
based personnel of a space project plan and organize their work and how such
planning and organizing relate to work outcomes, an extensive longitudinal
study of the management and execution of the Space Lab Mission Development
Test III (SMD III) was performed at NASA Ames Research Center. (ARC) in 1976.
The purpose of this paper is to provide members of future projects with a view
of the problems likely to arise in their organizations and to provide some
methods of coping with these problems. After summarizing the conclusions and
recommendations that pertain strictly to SMD III management, we focus on the
broader context of future space facility projects a , d indicate additional prob-
lems that may be anticipated. Finally, we provide a model of management that
ie;,Ay be used to facilitate problem solving and communication — Management by
Objectives (MBO). Since MBO has its limitations, particularly when applied to
federally funded scientific projects, we also consider some problems of com-
munication and emotion management that MBO does not address directly. We
present models for promoting mature, constructive and sitisfying emotional
relationships among group members. These models are discussed in relation to
specific problems that were concountered in SMD III and are likely to arise in
future space facility projects.
INTRODUCTION
Hutrsn productivity and well-being in space are dependent on the effec-
tiveness with which projects are planned and managed. Effective and satisfy-
ing patterns of communication and organization among planning ^.nd support
personnel, crucial to the effective completion of projects, alEo in"luence the
morale, confidence, satisfaction, and performance of those who work within the
space facility. Ground-based planners and managers must perform creatively
and with great technical precision within demanding time constraints. Any
failure on the part of ground-based personnel. to discern quickly any organiza-
tional or technical errors can result in a mission that is fraught with ill-
will, low morale, distrust, poor communication, emotional stress and physical
illness; in turn, these factors may threaten the safety of the mission. Thus,
among the things that must be learned before long-duration manned space facil-
ities become operational is how to plan and manage the ground-based portion of
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such projects so that its members have the ability to develop efficacious com-
munication and effective, satisfying work relationships.
In order to learn how ground-based personnel of a space project plan and
organize their work, and how such planning and organizing relate to work out-
comes, an extensive longitudinal study of the management and execution of the
Spacelab Mission Development Test III (SMD III) was performed at Ames Research
Center in 1976. This study, which we will call the SMD III Management Study,
summarizes and documents the conditions surrounding the successful completion
of the project. Based on findings of to SMD III Management Study, an anal-
ysis was performed of the organizational problems that inevitably need to be
solved in the planning and managing of a space facility project, and recom-
mendations pertaining to future mission management were developed.
For detailed {reformation on the planning and management of SMD III, the
reader is referred to the full report of the SMD III Management Study by
Robert Helmreich et al. (ref. 1). That report summarizes and documents the
conditions surrounding the successful completion of the project as well as the
conclusions and recommendations derived from the study.
This report summarizes the findings of the SMD III Management Study and
the analysis and recommendations that were developed as a result of that study.
The purpose of this report is to provide members of future projects with a
view of the problems likely to arise in their organizations and to suggest
some method: of coping with those problems. After summarizing the conclusions
and recommendations that pertain strictly to SMD III management, we will focus
on what has been learned in the broader context of future space facility proj-
ects and indicate additional problems that may be anticipated. Finally, we
provide a model of management that may be used to facilitate problem solving
and communication — management b y objectives (MBO). Since MBO has its limita-
tions, particularly when applied to federally funded scientific projects, we
also consider very briefly some of the problems of communication and emotion
management that MBO does not address directly. As an example of theory in this
area we present Bowen's model for promoting mature, constructive, and satisfy-
ing emotional relationships among group members. These models are discussed
in relation to specific problems that were encountered in SMD III and are
likely to arise in future space facility projects.
This research was partially supported by NASA Grant NSG 2065, Robert L.
Helmreich, Principal Investigator. We wish to acknowledge the contribution of
Mr. Lawrence Chambers of NASA Headquarters for helpful comments on an early
draft of the manuscript.
BACKGROUND
A management study was initiated by Ames Research Center to document
SMD III (Spacelab ^1::sion Development Tast III) activities and problems. The
detailed findings and recommendations of this study, which are presented 'n
the formal report of the SMD ?II Management Study, are relevant to life
sciences as well as other scientific participation in future space missions.
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SMD III was the third in a series of ground-based simulation experiments
designed to test logistics and management procedures for life sciences space
experiments. SMD III differed from earlier simulations in that it was a
dedicated life sciences mission; that is, most of the experiments on board
dealt with humans or animals. All three simulations were conducted at Johnson
Spacecraft Center, Houston, Texas. Most of the life science support is at
Ames Research Center, however, so it was decided to make SMD III a collabora-
tive effort of Johnson Spacecraft Center and Ames Research Center. Ames
responsibilities were: to propose human and animal experiments for inclusion
in the test; to develop the hardware for the experiment and integrate it into
the experimental racks; to deliver the payload of equipment to Johnson Space-
craft Center; to develop documentation procedures for life sciences experi-
ments; to conduct crew training for the Ames experiments; and to provide crew
and management personnel as necessary for the successful completion of the
pro,jecl.
Ames Research Center Experiment Proposals were solicited April 9, 1976,
and final selections were made after an initial review of each proposal by a
joint Johnson Spacecraft Center-Ames Research Center committee. The crew was
selected and hegan training at Ames Research Center, first in the individual
laboratories of the principal investigators, then in a partial Spacelab
configuration. The integrated equipment was shipped to Johnson Spacecraft
Center on February 14 where it was re-assembled and double-checked in the
simulator. The crew then trained on all experiments individually in the
final Spacelab configuration. Final training was a preliminary run of
2 days of the actual 7-day simulation. The 7-day simulation began May 17,
only 2 days later than originally scheduled. The test was successful:
it did not fall seriously behind schedule, and all experiments but one
produced usable data. Ames Research Center fulfilled its responsibilities
for staff, experiments, and hardware, and the two Centers collaborated
successfully in bringing about the simulation.)
Another goal of SMD III was to set up and test the operational problems
which would be associated with a Science Operations Remote Center (SORC).
Since most principal investigators were at Ames Research Center, and the simu-
lation was conducted at Johnson Spacecraft Center, a SORC was set lip at Ames
which received data from the simulator in Houston for review by individual.
principal investigators. The SORC concept operated well once the data link
was established; there were few data handling problems during the simulation
(ref. 1, pp. 3-4).
'The reader i_7 referred to the following sources for more detailed description
of the project. and recommendations for future Spacelab missions: (1) the
SMD III Science Management Report, coordinated by John A. Rummel and Paul X.
Callahan. October, 1977; (2) Spacelab Mission Development III Test Operations
Report, Glen H. Cress III, August 29, 1977 (this report was originated from
the Johns-n 2nr.cecraft Center side of the project and refers the readers to
other Johnson Spacecraft Center reports on SMD III); and (3) two SMD III arti-
cles in Aviation Week and Space Technology issues of May 9 and June 27, 1977.
Pr
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WHAT WAS LEARNED BY THE SMr III STAFF AND BY THE MANAGEMENT STUDY TEAM
Project members developed expectations, attitudes, and skills that enabled
them to solve the problems that arose and thus to make SMD III a success. This
learning would be beneficial if transferred to subsequent projects. In
general, effective teams should have continuity of personnel.
Individuals also learned expectations and strategies for coping with orga-
nizational problems that can now be avoided, given the insights gained through
study of the project itself. Such expectations often persist even when the
problems that produced them are no longer present, and can be counter-
productive by creating self-fulfilling prophecies and by causing antagonism.
This discussion is intended to create a new perspective on the problems that
were experienced. It is hoped that this perspective will enable managers to
suspend old expectations and eliminate or restructure old problems so that they
are easier to resolve.
The SMD III Management Study team examined the communication and organiza-
tion that existed within the project. By interviewing each project member
many times and comparing individuals' expectations of themselves and of one
another, it was possible to see the overall configuration of problems in addi-
tion to (and by abstracting from) the isolated symptions of problems. We
observed that sume project members inappropriately transferred habits suited
to individual scientific activities to the SMD III team project. We also
noted that a short-term team project, such as SMD III, requires new modes of
management that reconcile the needs of individual employees with the new
overall goals of the team and the organization. Such effective new modes of
management were not always established or effectively reinforced in SMD III.
Consequently, the project team sometimes labored under emotional stresses
that could have been reduced by changes in the managerial process.
We did not observe a lack of ability on the part of the individuals
within the organization; rather, we observed a lack of optimal adaptation to
the project mode of research organization. There developed some less-than-
optimal patterns of communication, organization, planning, and clarification
of roles between organizational units and within the hierarchical structure
of Ames Research Center. This lack of optimal adaptation to the project mode
of research and the partial use of old, inappropriate management patterns
were virtually unavoidable under the circumstances. That is, the lack of
training for project management, the time limitations, and the inadequate
staffing and resources inhibited optimal planning and managing of SMD III.
We noted that the Life Sciences Directorate is only beginning to develop
the capability to manage space missions. It is only through considerable
experience that project management teams learn project management. SMD III
was the first major effort to create such a learning process for manned
missions. The learning process is made diffir.ult by two circumstances:
First, the special problems of managing manned life science space missions
with on-board experiments are not yet understood. The process that NASA has
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successfully employed in physical science sksce projects (e.g., of building a
telescope on Earth and shipping it into space where it will probably work) is
not entirely appropriate to life science space projects (where the capacity of
a living organism, be it a mouse or a payload specialist, to function in space
is as yet poorly understood). In its pioneering attempts to do life science
research in space, Ames Research Center must define the special needs of this
research and find management mechanisms for meeting them. Ames must not allow
itself to be forced into management modes and time constraints that are found
to be incompatible with the successful conduct of life science research in
space.
Second, since its beginning in late 1961, the Life Sciences Directorate
at Ames has operated largely as an academic-type research organization. The
autonomy of scientists has been recognized as an important condition for the
stimulation of individual scientific accomplishment. Now, however, the avail-
ability of the Space Shuttle and Spacelab has created the opportunity for
dedicated life science missions, and such missions will require a project mode
of operation. The skills of managing individual scientific programs are not
necessarily the same skills needed for managing team projects. The Directorate
lacks a highly experienced team of project managers and an overall management
scheme that supports the project mode.
The success of SMD III is attributable to the extraordinary commitment,
ability, and creativity of its project team. It is hoped that this discussion
will, pinpoint some of the problems encountered so that future project teams
can confront those problems more directly and create a z+ore workable context
for carrying projects to satisfactory completion.
HOW TO USE THIS DISCUSSION
Remember that the problems and proposals presented here pertain to plans
for future spacelab projects, projects that will be more complex than SMD III.
Use the ideas presented in this discussion to identify possible problems
in future projects. The points raised here are suggestions of where to begin
problem solving in project planning and management, rather than firm recom-
mendations or conclusions that might guide any or all management activity.
This analysis expands on the recommendations contained in the SMD III Manage-
ment Study by suggesting a broader view of the problems and recommendations
that pertain to space mission management. No attempt is made to list all
potential problems or solutions.
Consider using the models of rational and emotional management processes
that are presented here as complementary ways of enabling members of a project
to take responsibility for creating and coordinating a team effort. Neither
model can be implemented exactly, but one model can be used to complement the
other.
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The first model, management by objectives, provides a rational plan for
development of broad-based decisionmaking, planning, evaluation and control in
organizations (refs. 2, 3). Ideally, management by objectives (MBO) begins
with top management, which sets forth a basic goal. Subsequently, at each suc-
cessive level, members of the organization set forth the objectives, roles,
and tasks required of them if the basic objective is to be achieved.
The second model, Bowen Family Theory, describes emotional dynamics of
enduring groups and organizations and provides guidelines for creating com-
munication (social and emotional patterns) compatible with the broadbased
decisionmaking system established through MBO (ref. 4). If MBO were to work
perfectly, that is, from the top down and with the full support and participa-
tion of top management, there would be relatively little need for understanding
and managing the emotional dynamics of the project group. In most organiza-
tions, however, MBO must be instituted in imperfect ways at lower levels of
management. The resulting communication "cut-off" with top management creates
problems and insecurities that must be remedied if the project team is to
function optimally. Bowen Family Theory explains dynamics of the emotional
ties that develop in enduring groups. It indicates how mature and construc-
tive emotional processes can be established and reinforced in groups, and how
to open communication with "cut-off" persons higher in the hierarchy.
PROBLEMS THAT MUST BE CONFRONTED IN FUTURE PROJECTS
Below are outlined two major kinds of management problems that require
extensive managerial experience and autonomy if they are tc be solved effi-
ciently: problems of project planning and problems of role clarification.
These problems are likely to arise in any real (as opposed to simulated) space
facility project.
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Problems of Project Planning
Four major problem areas in project planning that require further atten-
tion are: price estimation, documentation, career development, and time lines
for work to be performed in space.
1. Realistic price estimation must be do- , when the initial project
budget is being prepared. Congress is requiring stricter accountability and
budget overruns cannot easily be made up from ether funds. Incorrect budget-
ing will badly weaken projects. Realistic price estimation calls for total
team commitment to the project; that is, close, deeply committed working
relationships among principal investigators, engineers, and managers —
relationships that did not emerge in the early stages of SMD III. A related
problem that has plagued other NASA projects is that cuts or redistribution
of funds, subsequent to project planning, force a project to operate on a
lower budget than originally planned. Contingency plans are needed for
setting priorities and reducing the scale of projects if necessary. By plan-
ning these contingencies ahe.a4 cf L.ime, political in-fighting and poorly
considered comprowls ,;,; become less likely should budget cutting occur.
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2. The role of documentation should be carefully thought out at the
beginning of project planning. Documentation is the memory, recall, and
selective attention system of the project, and should be developed so that
it performs these functions with maximum efficiency. (In contrast, in SMD III
the formal control documentation procedure inundated project members with all
tentative plans, and with all changes in plans.) Informal planning and inte-
gration of payloads by the project engineers or managers need to be carried
out in consultation with the documentation specialist. Informal documenta-
tion, as well as control documentation, should be flagged to get the attention
of those whose attention is required. There must be a cooperative relation-
ship between project managers and the control documentation officer so that
experiment-requirements documents are completed by the time they are needed by
others (such as those who monitor contracts for hardware development), and so
that nonessential preliminary information does not get included in the control
documentation.
3. Career development planning needs to be made explicit in future proj-
ects. In SMD III, some project members perceived that their position in
their regular organizational unit would be jeopardized by participation in the
project, and their performance was impaired as a consequence; however, there
was no avenue for exploring or resolving these matters. Although projects are
tempr,rar', they are potentially important to career development; therefore,
the z-,-.ial employment problems connected with project participation must be
made explicit. The risks, r.ewardb, concerns, goals, and uncertainties of the
project should be discussed by management and project personnel. at the outset
of the project and periodically thereafter. Contingency plans .must be devel-
oped jointly that enable management and staff to reduce risks to self and to
NASA, to increase the rewards to all, to clarify concerns, and to deal with
the uncertainties as wisely as possible. For example, as the project pro-
gresses, personnel should be assisted in preparing for professional alterna-
tives beyond the project. There should be clear-cut priorities so that proj-
ect staff reductions resulting from budget cuts could be anticipated.
4. Time lines based on Earth-ideal estimates create unrealistic expecta-
tions of personnel who perform work within the space facility. Appropriate
time lines must be established for on-board work, allowing for space condi-
tions and the crew's inexperience in working in such conditions.
a. In this regard, appropriate goals, lead times, staff, and budget,
must be established so that man-machine engineering can be done properly
and so that life science procedures can be adapted to Space Shuttle condi-
tions. Before the project is budgeted, ideal zero g working conditions for
the payload specialists must be defined. Man-machine problems and problems
of adapting scientific procedures to space must be considered during all
stages of payload development.
b. Realistic contingency time lines must be established so that
unexpected scientific findings can he responded to. The purpose of manned
scientific missi ons is Lo provide a system component — a person — who is
able to respond to the unexpected scientific event. Yet time lines
typically do not take such contingencies into account.
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sc. Overall time lines need to be established by making broad-based
decisions that take into account the entire sequence of tasks that must
be performed at each level of the project. To ensure that overall time
lines and specific subsets of time lines are re_sonable, experts from
prior projects should be identified and queried early in project planning.
Problems of Providing and Reinforcing Clear Roles
Five major problem areas of role clarification that require further atten-
tion are: creating general role clarity for all project personnel, clarify-
ing the long- and short-term roles of persons whose work crosses organizational
boundaries, clarifying to principal investigators the nature and degree of
commitmenr that the project will require of them, clarifying; and supporting the
role of project engineers, and clarifying and monitoring roles of non-NASA
project personnel located at non-NASA locations.
, 1. In general, project managers need to develop highly sensitive ways
of clarifying roles and enabling persons to fulfill needed roles. There are
three main ways of doing this: through selection and placement procedures,
through communication and leadership training, and through job redesign.
a. Selection and placement. The manager needs to reassess from
time to time whether given individuals are best suited to the roles that
hp•:e been assigned to them and make reassignments accordingly. Because
of an individual's personal characteristics or the character of his
permanent position in the organization, it may be difficult to accomplish
a given role, whereas another role might be fulfilled with ease.
b. Communication and leadership training. Most individuals find it
difficult to communicate across organizational boundaries or with indi-
viduals with whom role relationships are not clearly established. This
i3 particularly true for projects in which communication lines and proj-
ect objectives have not been made clear throughout the organizational
hierarchy. There are many types of training in communication and leader-
ship that enable individuals to overcome normal inhibitions about com-
municating under difficult and disagreeable conditions to create channels
of effective communication and to get the job done. effectively. Ideally,
managers should have knowledge and experience with such programs so that
they can recommend them to others as needed.
C. Job redesign. As a project develops, the magnitudes of individ-
ual's roles expand and contract. Managers need to be aware of these
changes, and should be prepared to redesign roles and re-delegate respon-
sibilities when appropriate.
2. Major projects inevitably cross organizational lines. Thus, the var-
ious individuals working within a project have different kinds of ncnproject
responsibilities (e.g., commitments to ongoing programs, permanent job descrip-
tions, possibilities for promotion or transfer, and so on). Project managers
need to be sensitive to these differences among persons.
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3. Principal investigators need to know what kind and how much of a
commitment they are expected to make to the project. They need a clear under-
standing of the risks and rewards involved. This information should Le com-
municated at the time project research proposals are solicited and again when
preliminary proposals are accepted. The character of the required commitment
should be made clear in a formal written document, and should be restated and
discussed by the individuals who administer or supervise the proposed work.
Supervisors should make it a point to learn what other responsibilities the
principal investigator is likely to have at the time of involvement with the
project. A two-state peer review process such as the following should be
instituted.
Initial proposals should be solicited that outline the theoretical impor-
tance and general procedures and hardware required. These proposals would be
evaluated both by a peer review committee, for scientific merit, and by a tech-
nical committee, for feasibility and problems of integration with other candi-
date projects. If the solicitation shows that there is an extremely high level
of peer review, peer collaboration, and intensive peer cooperation and problen.
solving throughout the project, people will be discouraged from submitting
poorly thought out or dishonest proposals. They will see that any lack of
integrity will be found out and cause them professional embarrassment with
both government administrators and their academic peers. Proposals could be
ranked within ::;ur broad categories: (1) not scientifically worthwhile,
(2) not technically feasible, (3) worthwhile with technical or other modifica-
tions, and (4) worthwhile and feasible as proposed. It should then be possible
to group proposals by theoretical or methodological similarity ana to ascertain
overlap between studies. At this point, communication could take place with
principal investigators whose proposals were ranked as category 3 or 4. In
particular, recommendations could be made that investigators sharing theoret-
ical or methodological approaches, consider an integrated proposal and that
further integration with a NASA principal investigator be explored. It would
be appropriate and highly desirable to provide limited funds to principal
investigator candidates for such activities.
This recommendation for encouraging collaboration is made in the realiza-
tion that collaboration may be counter to the research style of many scientists
and that collaborative work may tend to seek the lowest common denominator of
scientific excellence. It is felt, however, that the nature of research in
Spacelab requires a high degree of teamwork and that the development of a
team approach may be more effective if the principal investigators play an
active role in the process rather than having such a structure imposed after
the selection of an experiment for a mission. It is felt that the scientific
integrity of joint proposals can be maintained by having this preliminary
integration and modification take place before final peer review for accep-
tance.
After principal investigators with proposals in categories 3 and 4 have
responded to initial feedback and submitted revised and more detailed pro-
posals, final scientific and technical review and acceptance or rejection
could take place.
9
It is also recommended that additional scientific review by peer committee
take place after acceptance and before flight simulation to evaluate the effect
of integration and later modifications on the scientific worth of the study.
The essence of these recommendations is that scientifi.: review and inte-
gration of the battery of experiments proceed hand-in-hand and that principal
investigators be included is the process during the review and early modifica-
tion stages. The fostering of communication between potential principal
investigators and program management early in planning should also aid in the
creation of an effective research-management team (ref. 1, pp. 67-68).
4. Special planning and sensitivity are needed to enable project engi-
neers to secure the full cooperation from principal investigators and equipment
contractors. Engineers need to be given the administrative and fiscal author-
ity necessary to accomplish tasks prescribed by the principal investigators.
Failure to give engineers sufficient authority will result in failure of the
project to meet its time lines.
5. Special effort is needed to clarify and monitor roles in NASA-
non-NASA collaborative groups. The authorities and responsibilities of each
role must be clearly defined so that roles can be understood by all and filled
by others if existing personnel leave the project.
There are many situations within a project that require highly organized
planning and extensive role clarification. The following three situations are
presented to illustrate this need.
Example 1: Directors of subprojects (i.e., :scientists, engineers, and
others in charge of individual components of the project) lack the authority
and often the ability to integrate their projects with the rest of the payload.
It is essential to have a senior project manager who can direct this work and
clarify the planning and role relatiunships required to facilitate integration
of subprojects. Senior managers are needed who can accurately budget the work,
create realistic time lines and develop the experiment-requirements document
describing exactly how the project will be carried out. The scientist who is
inexperienced at project management serves primarily as a consultant; the proj-
ect manager takes responsibility for making the scientific project operational
in space. The project manager essentially trains the scientist in management
of his own program. If the scientist is involved in a series of missions, he
may not have to rely as much on the project manager in later flights. In any
case, however, there is a need for project managers whu are experienced in
price estimation, creation of contingency budgets to handle budget cuts, docu-
mentation of the experiment, communication of exact commitments to all involved
in the project, reviewing and monitoring at all stages, and creation of appro-
pziate time lines for all phases of the project.
Example 2: Matters internal to NASA may arise that cause project members
to withdraw some of their time and energy from the project. Such matters
might include reorganization and reduction in force, possible relocation of
NASA employees to other Centers, and the start of new projects. In such
cases, project management must know how to revise plans quickly and direct
others to fill the roles that are vacated.
10
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Exa?Tle 3: When personnel take on increasingly complex roles that gradu-
ally change in the course of the project, they need a means to create new role
agreements with the other personnel. Conflicts must be resolved between taking
the initiative (and perhaps taking on roles that ultimately do not serve the
project) and continuing with old role agreements (which may become dysfunc-
tional as role requirements change). The project team must have rescurces for
planning and role clarification that are adequate to these tasks. Management
by objectives offers such are6ource.
MANAGEMENT BY OBJECTIVES
Management by objectives (MBO) is an effective way to communicate and
coordinate activities within a project or organization. If carried out as
prescribed, MBO would be a significant help in resolving the problems identi-
fied in the previous section. Unfortunately, MBO is difficult to implement in
government agencies that conduct and direct scientific and engineering pro-
grams. MBO, as operationally defined, is results-oriented. MBO works well
when the output is fairly tangible, the method of production well defined,
top management is clearly ce...mitted to the product, and the commitment is
appropriate to the budget. However, there are two major reasons why these
conditions do not hold for large scientific projects that are budgeted by
Congress and managed by a government agency.
First, objectives are rarely clear. Government agencies challenge man-
agers to discover the main objectives of their programs. Congress often
changes its views, hence managers cannot be sure where programs are beading,
how they will get there, and how performance will be judged. Top management
within agencies is often more conc2raPd with influencing Congress than with
formulating, communicating, and supporting the agency's objectives.
Second, MBO requires that communication and planring flow downward in the
hierarchy in a systematic way, but it.. scientific projects, in which creativity
and discovery are vested in the individual scientists, the flow is predomi-
nately lateral and upward, rather than downward. The literal application of
MBO ground rules to a space science project might result in inappropriate
planning and gauging of progress. Top management might set goals that would
prove unworkable. Inappropriate yet easily quantifiable measures of progress
might be used rather than measures that are appropriate yet difficult to
quantify.
T:ius, the value of MBO in space projects lies not in its literal applica-
tion but in the conceptual tools it offers for understanding what needs to be
communicated (upward, laterally, and downward).
The purpose of this section is to show how the basic planning of SMD III
might have occurred under a system of managing by objectives. MBO is now
widely known to NASA managers and is described in various publications
(refs. 2, 3, 5).
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IManaging by objectives involves top managers devising long-range goals
and having subordinate managers establish the corresponding objectives for
their departments or units. After top management approves the objectives
developed by its subordinate units, the process is passed on to the next lower
unit and ultimately down to individLal employees. Since all employees partic-
ipate in defining roles and standard; for themselves, it is clear w:,o is
responsible for enacting each role that is defined. Finally, each role is
integrated into the career and manpower planning of the organization. All
individuals are clearly rewarded for their commitment to the objectives and
to their own development in roles they helped define.
Managing by objectives is not rigid. It is a context within which people
plan in an organized way and get feedback on their progress. There are fre-
quent reviews. Objectives and riles are changed as required by the emerging
problems that are identified. The system's advantage does not lie in creating
task structure or roles. Rather, a system is established for continually
restructuring and reevaluating so that dysfunctional or ambiguous working
relationships are quickly identified and remed4ed. A second important function
is creating a clear understanding throughout the orgai,ization of each
individual's responsibility, so that the source rather than the symptoms of
problems can be addressed. A thirA and perhaps most important function is to
provide a system of broad-based decisionmaking whereby individuals contribute
by defining their roles in carrying out organizational decisions. This process
is shown in figures 1•-3 and is discussed below (figs. 1-3 are reproduced
through the courtesy of Scott, Foresman Company, publisher of ref. 3). This
is a well-known way to improve the quality of information and thus to improve
the decision processes of an organization. It also increases the level of
motivation and commitment of individual employees. We turn now to the
application of Fl.Io to space facility management.
The Value of MHO
As mentioned earlier, managing by objectives requires a total commitment
(limited only by resources) to a clearly defined goal by managers at all levels
of the hierarchy. This kind of commitment at higher levels of management
rarely exists anywhere and, as suggested previously, certainly not in scien-
tific projects within government agencies. However, it is useful to under-
stand the planning and communication that maximall y facilitate goal fulfill-
ment, even if such planning and communication are incomplete.
Project personnel need a conceptual framework for understanding the ideal
pattern of communication, so that they can predict how the pattern will be
disrupted when the info.mation flow has failed at some level in the organiza-
tion. The daily demands of running a project are so great that managers often
do not have the time to discern disruptions in the overall flow of communica-
tion unless they know just what to look fur. With a conceptual framework of
how information shouZd flow, one can recognize when "upstream" problems are
developing, how they will affect one's own work, and how to resol-1 .t them before
they become cii9es.
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Figure 2. - MBO as a system.
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Figure 3. - A cascade approach to goal setting.
If all participants in projects can share a common language (such as MBO)
for understanding problems in communication flow, they can detect, discuss,
and resolve problems far more easily. SMD III personnel did not share such a
common language. For example, the project manager developed an excellent sixth
sense for perceiving and understanding "upstream" problems before they became
serious or disruptive. He found that one of his most difficult jobs was to
persuade other members of the team to look up from their day-to-day concerns
long enough to see the broader problems and identify effective ways of han-
dling them. A common understanding among project personnel of the desired
flow of communication would have facilitated problem solving and
decision-making.
The Organization of this Discussion
In chapters 1 through 3, of reference 3, pp. 1-45, there is a detailed
conceptual overview of MBO. The concepts discussed in those first three
chapters will be used extensively in this discussion. The four essential
elements of MBO are: (1) goal setting, (2) action planning, (3) self control,
and (4) periodic reviews. There are eight major steps in carrying out these
elements. The four elements and eight steps are illustrated in figure 1. In
figure 2, these components of management are integrated into a system of
management activities. Using this framework, we will now examine the manage-
ment activities of SMD III to see what planning and communication actually
occurred and what would have been constructive but did not occur.
16
The Flow of Goals and Responsibilities in SMD III:
Steps 1-4, Figure 3
1. A long-Y-ange objective (e.g., over five to ten years) of NASA and of
the Life Sciences Directorate at Ames Research Center is to become an opera-
tional facility for originating life science research that will be performed
on Space Shuttle missions. Top management at Ames and at Headquarters,
however, has neither made this objective explicit, nor discussed any of the
uncertainties about this objective. Clearly, long-range objectives, uncer-
tainties about reaching objectives, and contingency plans for the agency and
its employees can be discussed meaningfully only if Headquarters and Ames
are aligned in their general goals and are actively engaged in a cooperative,
open working relationship.
This failure to establish common goals and an open working relationship
clearly influenced the team effectiveness of SMD III. For example, some prin-
cipal investigators did not organize their work to meet :NASA's long-range
objective. From the interviews with individual principal investigators, it
appears that some came up with various possible interpretations of the ambigu-
ity: (1) some did not believe that Ames Research Center actually would devote
itself to the long-range objective and hence believed that SMD III was an
exercise in futility; (2) some believed that Ames would not reward those who
devoted themselves to this long-range objective as opposed to the traditional
objective of doing individual scientific research, and hence believed they
would be risking their careers by devoting their energies to SMD III rather
than to their own individual research; (3) some believed that the project mode
of research simply was not much different from individual research, which
would lead them to hold an unrealistic view of what was required of them to
create a successful SMD III "mission."
These interpretations were not unreasonable. Indeed, SMD III was not
given a clearly defined budget, and there were no dedicated life-science mis-
sions slated for the immediate future. Some principal investigators who
dedicated themselves to working on SMD III as requested found themselves in
trouble when they returned to their own individual research projects — many
were held accountable for failing to keep to original schedules for their
individual research and their future research budgets were jeopardized.
Finally, the differences between a project mode and business-as-usual were riot
explicitly discussed.
By failing to be clear about its long-range goal, top management created
a setting for confusion. Individuals did not know where to place their com-
mitment; lack of clarity placed unnecessary work and stress on everyone con-
cerned.
How could top management have been clearer? Of course, no one can be
certain what kinds of budgets Congress will give to NASA for future space
missions. How, then, should top management communicate its basic goals? The
problem is actually little different from that of most businesses where market
factors are unknown. What is required is that top management continually
explore and communicate with NASA employees the indicators by which one can
estimate the probability that the Agency's goals are reachable. Indicators in
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the external environment that predict whether Congress and society will sup-
port or fail to support Ames Research Center's goal may be assessed. These
indicators include national goals of science and government, availability of
budgetary support and current public evaluation of NASA's programs. When these
indicators reveal ambivalence toward NASA's program of science in space, top
management should communicate this clearly. Middle management could then
create flexible career ladders so that principal investigators would allocate
some time to both individual and project research. In short, management
should acknowledge uncertainty when it exists.
Top management needs to assess its resources and weaknesses in relation
to the task of meeting its goals. Are its facilities adequate? Is its
research activity configured appropriately? Do its scientists know what is
expected of them? Is goal setting systematically coordinated with performance
appraisal and reward?
The answers to questions about whether the external and the internal
environment can support a major new goal are often ambiguous. But the ques-
tions should be asked, and the answers — however ambiguous — should be com-
municated explicitly to the rest of the organization. Unclear indicators of
the probable success of the organization in meeting its goals should not be
ignored. Unclear indicators call for explicit communication and contingency
planning, that is, planning of alternative uses of resources and alternative
career ladders.
In the absence of explicit communication and contingency planning, as was
the :ase with SMD III, individuals are left to second guess top management and
do their own covert contingency planning. The result is harmful to the
individual and to the organization, in terms of lack of coordination, lack of
commitment, and low morale.
2. The specific objectives of the organization — ( Step 2 of MBO as shown
in fig. 1) are objectives decided upon by upper management that promote the
long-range goal of the organization. In the case of SMD III, no specific
overall objectives were set forth. It can, of course, be argued that the
objectives of SMD 1II were to evaluate the feasibility of Ames Research Center
project administration, to collaborate with Johnson Spacecraft Center, to
establish a remote operations center, and to initiate on-board animal experi-
ments. For purposes of MBO, however, this statement of objectives is incom-
plete. Although it may have been adequate for top management, it failed to
guide project management or the individual principal investigators. Their
objective had to be the successful conduct of these activities.
Whatever the objectives — to evaluate or to succeed — the statement gives
no indication of how to judge the degree to which the objective was met. What
specific, verifiable things were to be done? How would one determine whether
they were done satisfactorily? Not all objectives can be fully developed
before a project begins. Nevertheless, all objectives should be stated clearly
and revised or elaborated as deemed necessary in the course of periodic
reviews.
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The specific objectives of SMD III were somewhat different from the busi-
ness objectives discussed by Raia (ref. 3). The objectives of SMD III were
not to develop and market a product. The product involved the simulation of
life science space mission research involving large numbers of on-board
animals. To manage by objectives, upper management would have needed to state
explicitly the expected products and processes. The criteria for successful
completion of experiments should have been stated. These might have included:
payload specialist research procedures deemed satisfactory according to pre-
stated criteria worked out by the principal investigators, principal investi-
gator experiment development that met the pre-stated criteria set by the orig-
inal review committee and by the project engineer, and so on. Likewise, major
criteria for judging the effectiveness of the remote operations center and the
effectiveness of the collaboration with Johnson Spacecraft Center should have
been developed.
The final objective - development of an effectively managed project - is
the development of a process and of new skills within project personnel. How
can this be stated in terms of specific objectives? Since processes are less
tangible than products, the specification of objectives is somewhat more
subtle than that described by Raia. What must be specified are the information
that is to be developed and communicated, and the pattern in which it is to be
developed and communicated.
!
	
	
In the discussion that follows, suggested sets of objectives for develop-
ing an effective management process are set forth, in the cascading form sug-
gested by Raia and illustrated in figure 3. To be acceptable and motivating
to the members of an organization, objectives must, of course, be developed by
the organization's managers at each level, not by the authors of this discus-
sion. What is offered here is merely an example of what might be developed.
E
	
	
It is suggested that the following specific goals be set forth by upper
management. These, in turn, would be developed into performance objectives by
each appropriate subunit, and further broken down into specific tasks and roles
for individuals.
3. Specific project gb,jectives (Step 2 in figure 1 or Step 3 in
figure 3).
a, Define and communicate explicitly to all potential participants
the commitments required of personnel in the project mode. Include
explicit communication about the collaboration required among people from
different parts of the project (e.g., between engineers, managers, prin-
cipal investigators, trainers, payload specialists, control documentation
personnel, shop workers, procurement personnel). Include recognition of
the organizational boundaries Ehat must be crossed to accomplish this
collaboration and the difficulties of doing so. Include analysis of the
autonomy and cooperation, time commitment, and new skills that are
required for optimal performance, as well as analysis of new environments
and problems that individuals will have to face.
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b. Define and communicate explicity to all potential participants
the risks and rewards of involvement in the project mode. Include the
risks of having tiie mission or one's part in the mission cancelled, the
risks inherent in sharing research facilities with others on board the
shuttle, the risks of having to learn new skills, and so on. Include the
rewards that management has planned in terms of new career ladders, per-
formance evaluation opportunities, new training, and new status. The
ways in which one may view risks as potentials for rewards should be com-
municated as fully as possible. Periodic employee-management meetings
should be held to ensure that perceptions of project risks, rewards, and
uncertainties are shared and are as accurate as possible.
C. Define and communicate explicitly to all potential participants
the possible conflicting institutional demands that may be placed on them
and the steps that can be taken to resolve these conflicts. Define con-
flicts between overall NASA organization and project organization, between
organizational management and project management, between individual prin-
cipal investigators' resources (equipment and budget) and project
resources, and so on.
d. Define, organize, and participate in broad-based decisionmaking
using the system of managing by objectives. Define the lines of authority
and the role definitions, indicating who occupies each role at each level
of the organizational hierarchy. Define the sources and flow of informa-
tion so that individuals can obtain the information needed for decision-
making. Designate the needs for travel, phone, video, etc., to handle
communication and dissemination. This means defining a system of manag-
ing by objectives as illustrated in figure 2 and describes; by Raia
(ref. 3). Flaps 7 and 8 in figure 2 are crucial: bpecifying the steps
and scheuules needed to create regular and objective feedback to each
project member, flexible problem solving, and regular opportunities for
career development and reward. The flexibility with which the system can
respond by identifying and solving problems and rewarding individuals
should be assessed formally on a weekly basis.
e. Develop criteria for deciding what roles call for NASA employees
and what roles call for outside personnel.
4. Group objectives — ( Step 3 in figure 1 or Step 4 in figure 3). Each
of the specific overall organization objectives previously described is to be
translated further, by each group, into objectives of the activities of that
group. We will not continue here to list possible overall objectives or to
break these down into organizational objectives and individual objectives.
The managers and staff of future projects are best qualified to select their
own objectives.
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THE USE OF MBO WITHIN NASA PROJECTS
What we have done so far is to give examples of ideal patterns of com-
munication within the MBO model. Managers who understand the MBO model and who
have a sense of the pattern of ideal communication that enable people to agree
on goals and activities and keep one another apprised of progress can manage
by objectives. They do so by using the MBO model to discover what kinds of
objectives, planning, and review are needed and by initiating the eo"Mnieation
at their level, directing it upward, downward, and laterally as appropriate.
This, of course, does not result in the orderly flow suggested by Raia, but it
does result in communication and problem solving.
To initiate management by objectives from the level at which the need for
communication is perceived, various problems must be overcome. The two main
problems are (1) learning to perceive what objectives need to be set and how
they s;iould be communicated, set, and reviewed, and (2) learning how to com-
municate when channels have not already been established and communication is
not expected. These problems become easier to solve when workers understand
how MBO functions ideally and why ideal MBO procedures are impossible to estab-
lish with NASA scientific projects.
As mentioned above, the basic MBO concepts are clearly set forth by Raia
and a sense of some of the modifications needed in projects in the public
sector can be gleaned from Morrissey (ref. 2). Managers who wish to take the
initiative to implement MBO at their level need to take steps to sharpen their
perception of the problems that may arise. Managing a scientific project
involves far more than production of things. It also means developing practi-
cal systems of activity and of anticipating services and safeguards that are
ancillary to the ultimate product or activity (e.g., systems of safety, fire-
proofing, and so on).
How can one anticipate what activities will be needed? The following are
suggested ways to brainstorm:
1. Refer to documentations of previous scientific projects, such as
SMD III, to gain familiarity with the kinds of activities that have been
involved. By analogy, determine whether similar activities will be required
to complete the forthcoming project.
2. Discuss and explore percentions of the problems that are likely to
arise in the forthcoming project with persons who have worked on other space
facility projects.
3. Note the kinds of management problems and solutions that are discussed
in books on scientific management such as those by Morrissey (ref. 2), and
Sales and Chandler (ref. 5); note also the management problems that are '._mplied
in the discussions of space facility projects, politics, and activities in
popular biographical books about space facilities such as reference 6.
4. Share and discuss the objectives developed with coworkers and invite
them to develop and communicate their sense of necessary project objectives.
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5. Encourage the project director to invite brainstorming of this kind
at project meetings throughout the duration of the project.
To communicate effectively with project personnel and with persons in
other parts of the organization who interface with the project is another
matter, to which we now turn.
COMMUNICATION PROBLE24S IN IMPLEMENTING MBO
'	 Communication problems in the implementation of MBO or other management
schemes arise in various ways: (1) MBO is usually not implemented at higher
levels of management, so that there is a rift in the communication between
middle and upper management and between project members and liaison persons
located elsewhere in the organization. This rift is brought about by a dif-
ference in values, beliefs, and language connected with planning and manage-
ment; (2) even persons who have agreed to use MBO may, at times, lapse into
other ways of planning and managing; (3) individuals within a project are
likely to differ in the style in which they communicate and it is difficult to
establish rapport and to communicate effectively with persons whose style is
radically different from one's own; (4) some individuals are preoccupied with
personal worries about other matters or with private, uncommunizated feelings
about the person to whom they are speaking, and this interferes with clear com-
munication about work-related matters; (5) individuals may differ in their
evaluati.on of the importance of various project activities. Any of these five
situations are likely to lead to poor communication and planning which, in turn,
may lead to errors, coverups, distrust, blaming others, low morale, illness,
and so on.
There are various models of communication that offer insight into the
causes and consequences of poor communication, and i..ito ways in which com-
munication can be improved. Unfortunately, none of the existing models have
been tailored specifically to problems of management. Hence, a set of defini-
tive solutions cannot be given to the communication problems likely to arise
in the planning and management of space facility projects. However, Bowen's
model of communication is sufficiently general in scope and relevant to project
settings that it comes as close as any to offering a useful general blueprint
for improving communication in projects.
Murray Bowen, a psychiatrist, regards conflict, breakdown of old forms
of social organization, struggle to attain new objectives, and changes in
goals as prerequisites to the development of good communication and mature,
satisfying relationships. Apparently, those beginning a new project within
an existing organization are potentially off to a good start, for these are
precisely the conditions under which a new project begins to function in an
existing organization. The basic concepts contained in Bowen's model and
their application to various kinds of groups and organizations are described
by Hall (ref. 4); relevant ideas for program management are summarized briefly
here. Bowen's basic premises are:
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1. The mental and physical health of a group are revealed in and affected
by the way it copes with the conflict between need for deep emotional, social,
and or ganizational attachments versus need for growth and autonomy. For
example, a new project within a larger organization needs to function in new
ways, yet this interferes with established patterns of relating with members
of the organization, and threatens to disrupt previously satisfying relation-
ships and to jeopardize feelings of security. The health of members of the
project is affected by and revealed in the way in which they cope with this
conflict.
2. The effective response to this conflict is to create appropriate new
roles (through MBO), to communicate one's roles and plans openly, to experience
and accept the tensions that occur when changing the status quo, and to allow
others to resist one's new role, responding to any resistance simply by con-
tinuing to communicate the new role. One should not acquiesce to expectations
that one will return to the old role, nor shculd one respond in some dramatic
or lasting way to any lack of support received. The difficulty with imple-
menting MBO is that members of the organization tend to resist the formation
and enactment of the new goals and roles since these are a threat to the status
quo. The effective response to this resistance is to continue to communicate
the new roles and expectations, to accept the new r•le as the legitimate role,
to tactfully ignore old role expectations, and to continue communicating the
new, legitimate role expectations until they are fully accepted and acted
upon.
In contrast, two ineffective ways of responding are (1) to cut off com-
munication with those who threaten one's autonomy (i.e., the enactment of one's
new role) and disagree with one's objectives; and (2) to remain in the setting,
projecting anxiety on others, scapegoating, labeling others as inadequate or
the cause of problems, and making oneself or others weak, dependent, ill, or
unable to function.
A major informal role of managers and of individual staff members is to
clarify ways in which conflicts or lack of communication are opportunities for
growth. Facilitation of communication can be initiated from any or all loca-
tions, informally, by any individual who understands how to do so. This
includes communication within and bet.ieen Centers, and between a Center and
Headquarters. Communication is facilitated by identifying the inadequacies of
the existing communication (e.g., by identifying communication cut-offs within
the organization, or identifying those who are "stuck" within the old struc-
ture, making themselves or others unhealthy or inadequate) and by helping the
persons involved to re-establish communication with coworkers in an effective
way. We refer to these as informal roles, in contrast to the formal use of
MBO. MBO is a pcderful formal tool for establishing new roles and objectives
and communicating them. It is the "official" way for managers and staff to
respond constructively to conflict. MBO makes it easy to grow into appropriate
new roles that one creates largely for oneself in consultation with one's
manager, coworkers and subordinates. The MBO model makes it legitimate to set
up appropriate new roles that alter the status quo. However, more than MBO
is needed to enable project personnel to communicate openly. Managers will be
more effective if they are aware of the following repeated patterns of behavior
in their staff:
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1. Resistance to change in the roles of others who wish to change roles;
for example, failure to acknowledge new job titles or reporting charnels.
2. Unwillingness to accommodate to role changes brought about by the loss
of a member of the group.
3. Resistance by another to the role changes of individuals who must play
multiple roles.
4. Unwillingness to communicate with persons who resist one's own efforts
to take on new roles, a failure to resist old role expectations, or expressed
conflict over roles.
S. Resistance to mutual planning or discussion by persons anywhere in the
hierarchy, especially by persons at higher levels who do not wish to encourage
those below them to initiate requests, plans, or discussion.
6. Resistance to some specific roles because of incompatibility between
individual goals and project or organizational goals.
Effective leaders identify resistance and bring it into the open. They
shape, guide, and reinforce the new roles as required and make it clear that it
is everyone's responsibility to shape, guide, carry out, and reinforce the new
role relationships that are agreed upon. They also make it clear that these
role relationships may be changed, but only by discussion and explicit agree-
ment. Personal decisions to cut off communication, to take on roles that were
not agreed upon, or to complain or grow weak within the organization are recog-
nized as disruptive symptoms. All conflict is brought out into the open and
resolved through creation of new objectives and roles and through review pro-
cedures that ensure that the new objectives are being met satisfactorily. It
needs to be acknowledged at the outset and throughout the project that bringing
conflicts into the open and agreeing on new objectives and roles causes stress;
however, such stress leads to group growth and effective functioning, provided
that its members continue to communicate openly and honestly.
Effective managers remember that they must operate by the rules they
establish for others. When changes occur in policies, goals, personnel, and
roles, managers need to look within themselves as well as within others to see
what emotional resistances there are to the changes. They should provide
explicit acknowledgement of new roles, goals, personnel, communication chan-
nels, and problems. They should find creative ways to acknowledge and rein-
force new systems, for example, through new signs, written agendas, changes
in location of offices, titles, schedules, distribution lists, group meetings,
appointments, access to information resources.
Effective managers recognize that groups grow and change in the course of
a project and that this affects the quality of group communication and emo-
tional tone. If the project is planned in a satisfying way in the beginning,
group members will thrive on a high level of agreement and esprit de corps.
Eventually, however, group members will want to grow in their own roles in
ways that call for autonomous decisionmaking, and that will inevitably threaten
someone else's cherished status quo. Effective managers are ready for this
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shift from cl , ,--e cooperation and interdependency to dissatisfaction, striving
for new roles and threatening of status quo. They encourage project members
to express their perception of need for role change. They encourage the group
to be flexible, to remain in good communication about their perceptions of
objectives, and to plan and enact new activities without resistance. The
group must be reminded that as the project develops, the mark of its success
is the group's ability to reflect on its changing roles and goals, to make
appropriate choices, and to continue to examine the adequacy of the chosen
roles until the new goals are achieved. The group must be reminded again and
again that change in one part of the project necessarily produces changes in
other parts of the project and that this needs to be accommodated willingly and
discussed as appropriate.
The group will never cease to experience conflicts between its need for
stability and interdependency versus its need for growth and autonomy. Effec-
tive managers convey that this is so, and that the conflict should be cherished
and responded to with reflection, communication, planning, and reinforcement
of new agreements. It should not be responded to with thoughtless reaction,
submission, cut-off of communication, resistance, or rebellion.
Change always results in some stress. The effective manager needs to
recognize undesirable patterns of stress management (e.g., submission or
cutoff) and to help project staff members to seek more autonomous, planned,
and communicated moves through use of the MBO model. Usually. stress is expe-
rienced as coming down from above. Norms and demands tend to get transmitted
downward. New members of a group and individuals who do not communicate
effectively tend to experience much anxiety because they are unsure how to
respond to new demands and conflicts. MBO gives members at lower levels ways
to define new demands clearly in the form of objectives and to shape their own
roles so that they are compatible with overall management goals. Effective
manag ers facilitate this process and reinforce the new agreements thus
developed.
Undoubtedly, the most difficult and stress-producing communication in
groups where MBO is only partially implemented is communication upward to a
supervisor who does not want to share or take responsibility. The manager
who wishes to facilitate good communication with such a supervisor needs to
make it a point to understand that person and to communicate on a regular
basis, even if the communication is not reciprocated. The subordinate must
firmly communicate the fact that, for the superior's own benefit, he or she
must have the superior's support and there must be a free flow of relevant
information in both directions.
Processes of initiating communication under conditions of no agreement
and no cooperation are often facilitated by training. Workshops on communica-
tion are offered throughout the country and are well worth the time and cost.
The manager seeking to improve group effectiveness should explore one or more
of these and encourage other members of the project to do likewise.
In summary, we have tried to address some of the problems of management
we have encountered in the course of a simulated space mir^sion. It can be
/	
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anticipated that even more problems will arise in complex missions with hetero-
geneous crews and diverse goals. The success of space projects to date should
not result in the sanguine beti-L twat problems in space or in Earth/space
coordination will be minimal in the future. (For a discussion of psychological
adjustment in maturing, high stress projects, see refs. 7, 8.)
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